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Introduction
In his now classic article, Stefflre (1968) outlines a solution to
the problem of new product positioning In an existing market. Briefly,
his approach develops a "product space" spanned by the salient features
of the product, where existing brands and customers' ideal points are
plotted c By isolating regions in this space which contains ideal
points but no brand, the method indicates where a potentially untapped
market opportunity exists.
Although the model has been lr -gely accepted as useful, some prac-
tical drawbacks have been noted. For example, do the dimensions reflect
the actual choice influences and can they be validly and reliably mea-
sured? Can the brand be positioned accurately by a firm at a pre-
selected corner of the market? Will the product space remain constant
over time, or will customers or brands change their positions? In this
paper an attempt is made to deal with the last of these problems. More
specifically, tte analysis to be presented below utilizes the Stefflre
framework but extends it to the case where the existing brands 5 posi-
tions might be changing in response to the contemplated new product
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/productpositioni164joha
introduction. Such a possibility often needs to be considered by the
entering firm, in many consumer as veil as industrial markets.
The Model
We assume that the Stefflre analysis has been carried to a point
where we have determined the product space and the positions of compet-
ing brands and customer ideal points locations. "Our" firm is contem-
plating the introduction of p new brand and is basically able to
position this brand at any location in the space. The question is,
which location is "the best."
Clearly, we first need to define the objective(s) involved in our
brand introduction. At least four different objectives can be identi-
fied. The first candidate objective is profit maximization. Here the
positioning would be chosen in such a way that expected sales minus the
costs of obtaining them would be maximized. A second objective might
be simple sales maximization, where (at least in the initial stages)
che costs of obtaining the sales are of little consequence to our firm.
Thirds a possible objective plight be a "competitive niche" solution,
where our bi.'and will be positioned n a segment of tht. product space
not sofar well covered by the existing brands. As mentioned, such a
solution it; the one xacsc. often referred to ia the discussions of the
Stefflre model. Finally, the entering firm night be interested in locat-
ing at a position which will yield a maximum joint profit for the exist-
ing brands augmented by the new one. It should be noted for future uses
that whereas the two latter objectives explicitly takes into account
competitive brands, the first two objectives do not account for compe-
titors .

The next step is to express these objectives explicitly in terms
of the product positioning. First some notation. Let xjh denote the
position of firm k on dimension i. and y^ the idea) position of cus-j
tomer j en i. Let k*0 4 l»2, . . ,K with our firm denoted by k^Gj
j=l
J
2,...,J
>
and 1*1, 2,..., I. Denote a trial location r of brand k as
8, (y-xl-i ~x > o **' .x^r) . If we assume that the customer will pur-
£«»|£ tK.J-ri<.z x K..L"
chase the brand which most closely approximates his ideal brand, our
firm would attract customer j at a trial location indexed by r only if
1 2 k
(1) min
r
Dkj = min (^(.x^ - yjt ) )~
occurs at k*0. The trie I locations for the X competitors would here
be identical to their present locations , for example. This simple
Euclidean distance measure might be augmented by customar-snecif ic
weights on each dimension w.^ which would be proportional to the
importance the customer attaches to deviations on each dimension.
Similarly, brand specific factors not reflected in the product space
dimensions, such as price, &ay, could be introduce''. With
rp^ denot-
ing the price of brand k at (trial) location x , the i'th customer
will now be attracted to cur brand only
x.
(2> Bin Aj = :'V° r <r*ki " ?U> >'
occurs at k=0.
If we denote the unit sales potential to the j'th customer by Sj,
and define
, [ 1 if min D. . occurs at k^O
(d) r 6oj - \
* k>
otherwise
,
we can write the total sales to our firm as

(4) rTRQ = r p .^ Sj r 6oj .
Similarly, the total sales to any one competitor k becomes
(5)
r
TRk
«
r pk
j
E
1
s. r&kjJ
k-1,2, ...,K.
Turning to the cost side, we need to account for the fixed and
unit variable costs incurred when maintaining a brand at a certain
location x . These will be denoted
rFk and r ck , respectively. In
addition, for an existing brand contemplating relocation, "moving"
costs are incurred. These can be seen as specific to each firm and
dimension --moving along some dimensions are easier than others-~and will
likely be proportional to the distance moved. Accordingly, if we
denote the existing location jsk and the unit moving costs for firm k
mk£, the total costs incurred can be written as
<«> r
IC
" ,
F +
r
c jll s j r 60j
for our centering firm, a
I
(7) rTCR - r?k : m^ i r xki - ^ . !
,
for k«l,2, ....
We are then read/ to explicitly restate che four alternative
objective functions. Given the competitive end customer locations,
the profit -maximization objective can be written as
(8) max rP ft - max ( TRn - „TC~) ,
reS J reS r ° r °
where it is understood that the location parameter r can vary over the
whole product space S. The sales maximization objective becomes simply

(9) max rTR . ,
r eS
The competitive nichM goal can be translated into a positioning which
will minimise the total distances t -availed by customers, since this
will tend to place our brand into an untapped segment. Thus, this
objective is written .
(1) min TD,, * min £ min -D?, : .
reS r ° j-1 k r kJ '
where k*0,l,2, . . . ,K. Final! nt profit maximisation goal can
be expressed as
V
(11) max JP « max £ ( DL - TC.) .
rsS r U ceS ^-0
1 k r v
The corresponding formulations for any of our & competitors are straight-
forward to derive.
The actual optimization of these alternative objective functions
with respect to tne product positioning is not easily done with analy-
tical methods since the objective function surface contains several
local optima in all the cases. Consequently, a more appropriate method
to use is a search over the relevan ion. In smaller problems this
search can be exhaustive, simply scanning the objective function surface
from a superimposed grid. is the method followed in certain cluster
analyses, and will be followed in the empirical examples given later in
this paper. For larger problems uuch an exhaustive search becomes quite
costly, and can be replaced by a suitable standard non-linear optimisa-
tion search algorithm. In such Large problems a very crude grid might

be used to identify a promising starting point for the algorithm- -an
example will be given below.
It is proposed here this framework b<F, used to identify the
best product positioning ^:.oz_a given a preselected objective; and that
in addition, before actual entry, the model be used to predict the
losses suffered by each competitor, should we enter at this best posi-
tion; and further , that the model be used to predict the reactions by
the competitors by (1) ascribing a particular objective to each com-
petitor's actions, and (2) assessing the benefits of alternative com-
petitive relocations aimed at recapturing some of the losses, and
(3) predicting a most likely repositioning strategy for each competi-
tor following our entry.
Remembering that chosa competitive moves only represent potential
actions, we can furthermore use the model to reevaluate our initial
choice, given competitors' optimal relocations, anc continue another
round. And so on. In some cases it is clear that an entry will
'''It should v -* noted ;ne wc dualizing our approach-
is to see it as a clustering approach with the usua ance func-
tions being replaced by alternative objective functions.
It should also be poi~ sat nee all standard search routines arc
applicable here. Spei illy, a routine that searches along the main
axes of the product space is not appropriate, since distance, measures
are defined over the diagonals of the imp triangles formed by the
points. Thus, initial runs the Hooke & Jeeves direct/search rou-
tine were fruitless, whereas the modified simplex search routine of
Nelder 6c Mead proved quite efficient (for a discussion of these and
other routines, see Hiiamelblau, 1972). Since the illustrations used
for the paper were carried cut for a two-dimensional space, a complete
grid search was quite feasible and the approach used. As a "spillover"
payoff from the use of a search over trial locations, management can
easily evaluate several alternatives in any one run.

disrupt the existing shares to such an extent: that a new equilibrium
might be unobtainable. In such cases , a daring, sales-maximizing entry
will lead to a high likelihood for competitive reactions, whereas a
slightly more low-keyed positioning, using, say, a competitive niche
criterion } would lead to little upneavai in the market, and in the long
run be more advantageous to all parties. These are clearly only a few
of the possible cases which can be i red and analyzed using the
framework proposed here,
In what follows 9 the data requirements of the model will first be
discussed. Then a sequence of illustrative applications will be given
designed to show the range of model analyses possible.
Data Requirements
In order for the framework to be applicable all the data necessary
for the Stefflre analysis is required. That is, the firm must have
invested a substantial amount of money into the research and deriva-
tion of the dimensions making up the product space, and customer and
brand locations in that space. Incidentally, it might be pointed out
that a gooo validation check on the dimensioning of the space and the
locations derived consists of simply predicting market shares from the
given positions, and compare with actual chares. If deviations occur,
corrections in, for exa . the weights in the distance formula (2)
might be warranted or a reconsideration of the dimensions chosen could
be necessary.
In addition, our firm needs to specify the cost structure involved
at alternative locations, as well 33 its relocation costs should such
moves be necessary after an Initial positioning. These figures should

8be available quite easily from internal records, assuming the firm has
been producing and marketing similar products in the past. If not,
estimates would have to be arrived at through a study of competitors'
situation and general trade, data.
As for competitive data, we are basically interested in what
reactions will come forth following our alternative brand positionings
.
If firm predictions can be made on the basis of past experience, manage-
ment intuition, or other available information, the procedure to follow
is clearly to impose these predictions directly upon the product space,
and then reiterate the analysis for our brand. Most of the time such a
straightforward approach 1.1= not feasible, and instead more indirect
information has to be utilized. $e would then need data on competitors 5
cost situation, including moving costs, some of which would undoubtedly
have to be inferred on the basis of rather scanty information. On the
other hand* in the case where our firm has produced and marketed similar
products in the past
s
its own cost structure should be of some, guidance.
Furthermore, an assessment of the objective--and thus the propen-
sity to react--of eac h >etitor vill have to be made. Here guidance
will be given by past competitive actions as well as published informa-
tion about the competitors gen - . A great deal of management judg-
ment seems necessary in the final analysi wever, taking into account
present and expected future conditions in the market, which would affect
the objectives of a competitor at the time of entry.
In the model, varying customer potentials and dimension weights
are incorporated. Such data would usually be estimates on the basis of
market research. In the case of industrial products ? whera each cus-
tomer might be of considerable importance, the data are fairly easy to

9get. As for consume! goods--the case dealt with in the usual Stefflre
ana lysis --each custoo merally be seen as the centroid
of a homogeneous ent, in which case the potential would
represent the tol /-it sales to that , data which are also
reasonably easy to o e dimension weights would here have to be
the average weights of the particular segment at hand.
S ome 1 1 1u & t ra t iye
mn
Ap
.p.1 ica i 1
In the following sections, some examplifying applications of the
model framework in a given market structure will be given. A few sim-
plifying assumptions implicit in the preceding model development will
be maintained through These state that (1) the total market is not
increased by the new entry, (2) the case of loyalties and other factors
making a customer stay with a brand further away than another have all
been reflected in the price weight, but tnat (3) in the case of a tie
in the weighted distances the existing brand will keep the customer.
These assumptions can be relaxed without much difficulty, but the main
features of the analysis < Lbited more clearly without the
added complexity,
The model was js< tative product positionings in
a 2-dimensional space with ing coi tors and 15
ideal poj ns are depicted in Table 1
2
,The initial positio- of the esc rands was chosen so as to
correspond to a iln real world situation found in many cases.
placed one brand (the MoldM brand, here labelled competitor one) close
to a fairl) at the core of the market.
The other brand (the "dynamic*' one, competitor two) was placed squarely
in the middle of a set tomers/segments , not very close to the old
brand. 'The approacl using starting points equal to the competitive
niche or joint profit d Lzing solutions was avoided because the
equilibrium state I y Is so rarely found in the real world.
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The unit variable costs for the positioning firm were allowed to differ
between alternative locations, depending linearly upon the distance
from a "minimum cost" point located at the origin. Thus, when an alter-
native location was considered, unit variable costs were computed as
the intercept plus a slope coefficient times the absolute distance the
origin (see Table 1).
In the runs presented here, the fixed costs were set as constant
over the whole product space. Both variable and iixed costs differed
between the firms, but in this particular application all the firms
were assigned the same moving costs. Price for the positioning firm
was computed as a markup on unit variable costs, so as to allow for
different prices at different locations. The markup was set at 407„
for all the runs. An exception to this pricing practice was made for
the runs where the objective was joint profit maximizing, since that
objective was maximised where costs ~-and consequently price—was espec-
ially high, leading to extreme positionings . In these cases the price
for the positioning firm was set at competitive parity, computed as the
average price of the comp< brands. These choices of parameter
settings could be immediately . ed to the particular cape at hand
without any complications of the model's subsequent application. The
settings here were chosen so as not to complicate, the applications
unnecessarily. For the sine reason, the customer weights of the sep-
arate dimensions* Wj^, were set equal to 1.0 £or all the customers.
The Case, of No Competitive Response
Using the proposed framework to its full advantage requires an
analysis of what competitors might do if we introduce our brand at some
particular location^ There are several situations that could occur*
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First
>
it might; be reasons. assume that: competitors will
react very reluctantly--tl anagemant is conservative , for exaraple--or
if they decide to react, they can only do so after a long delay. The
first case will sometimes occur in markets where t isting brands
are old and well established and no new introduction has been made
recently. The second ca&e would often obtain in markets where position-
ing is based upon Ic arm image development and a change in image
difficult and timeconsuming~-automcbiles is a case in point,
Under the. assumption Lack of reaction, the positioning case
becomes equivalent to the Staff Ire approach. The best choice would
simply be given by the model once the objective is specif ied-~and the
optimal location would be found subject to the fixed positions of the
existing brands.
In such a case, a firm might enjoy some considerable benefits
from a profit, maximizing location. This is clearly examplified in
Figure 1, which depicts the results from rhe initial runs. As can be
seen, the prof
i
position~-at location 3/2~-yields profits
about double those of the competitors . This occurs only because of the
switching of cust >nd competitor, however, who 1c
seven of his ten cus d woul react in some way.
The sa ive would argue for a similar position-
ing in this case wi Ly identical re 3. The competitive
niche solution places our brand .{pected in a rather untapped seg-
ment of the space--at location 4/-2--but even these customers repre-
sent considerable lost to the competitors. The sales are nov, more
evenly divided, however, as compared to the profit maximizing case.
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Finally, in the joint profit maximizing case the optional location
is at -2/-1 placing the new brand squarely in between che two existing
brands. As in the ease of the niche solution the joint objective is
less aggressive than the profit maximizing alternative, but some loss of
sales will by necessity occur, this time mainly from the first compe-
titor. If the losses take place . Jicated by the x^eighted dis-
tance formula, one would think that" competitor one would have to react
in some fashion to the new entry.
The ...Caae. o f., a _Comjg>et it iye Ro-pos it ionln
^
From the first, set of runs of the model we can establish three
alternative optimal entry positions depending upon the objective func-
tion chosen., It is clear that if the management judgment in our firm
is that no moves will be undertaken by the existing brands, the 3/2
location is the , On the other hand a safer strategy might be to
opt for the niche solu under the assumption that, none of the com-
petitors will accept the potential losses of our other two positionings
without reacting In such a cav ntry light do better in the
long run by a Less agj :ming.
Tht In th< analysis clearly consists of analyzing
the possible moves , response to cur entry.
One alternative would be that there could be a reaction
after some delay, bi I ter su aent everybody would
"settle down. 1 - This could b iere reaction is possible
3
It should perhaps be noted Chat in the last two cases customer satis-
faction is likely to be greater than in the profit maximizing case,
since the number of well differentiated oroduct alternatives is greater
This is a case, then, where a profit maximizing approach is not tanta-
mount to maximal customer satisfaction.
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within a reasonable pen >f time—and competitors are willing to
move--but any further n (its are infeasibie because of prohibitive
costs and/or negative customer reactions. Many cosmetics products
would provide cases. /int. deoff between two alternative
positionings would then c nd upon the length of the planning
horizon relative to tl the reaction period. If the latter
is brief relative to ie payoff after reaction will matter
most, and vice versa
.
ere gives us the ability
to evaluate--!., iltei re objective functions -"-what
their likely reactions will be.
The results of such an analysis are presented in Figure 2. The
figure depicts the v, Locations that competitor two would choose
given our entry position and a particular objective function. Thus,
the challenging prof it tnizing entry by our firm at location 3/2
leads to a simple relocation by a prof it -maximizing competitor two,
Just shifting dowc recover the lost "core" segment and
still maint* most of the old customers. This simple
readjustment is a I Lion of t roblem commonly known
as the "beach icecream se, where a positioning close to a
competitor will take aw s to one side, but will also make
a quick ,ln
It is that with our challenging entry, if
competitor two want. tve loping a new niche for himself
rather than a simp challenge he will move down to our first
niche position at 4/-2. Although this would sometimes seam a less
likely outcome in any real world setting. It might well describe
Detroit's initial reaction to some of the sub compact imported cars.
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In the esse the react; oipetitor two operates under, a joint
profit maximizing object ive--perhaps in a sense accepting the fact that
now there will he three btar. jre the to1 market— the optimal
location will be at 1/0, that is in-between the new entrant and the
existing rand 1. J ie case of the niche solution the profits
will be ided amo ie three brands, and even with the
relatively small move involved setter "fit" to consumer desires
is obtained.
In Figure 3 are depicted the reactions on the part of competitor
1 to our entry at the profit maximizing position 3/2. They ail incor-
porate considerable moves from the present position. When it is
realized that our introduction only attracts one customer from compe-
titor 1 the model predictions should be treated with some care, how-
ever. In fact, the existing location of competitor 1 is subontimal--
even without a new entry--using any one of the four objective functions
When this turns out to be the case, one would assume that the predicted
moves will not materialize, unless t sses suffered were quite high.
In the present case it seems safe o assume that competitor 1 will not
•e (one possible alternat jjactive that might correctly char-
acterize competitor one's present p be a desire for
"stability").
Turning r competitive niche loning, again our sales will
draw mostly from compe competitor one not being touched any-
more than in the profit ioaximizxn^ esse. This can be seen clearly in
Figures 4 and 5. For the second competitor the profit maximizing loca-
tion involves hardly any move at ail, an indication of the advantage of
our less aggressive entry positioning. The sales maximization option,
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however, still leads to a challenging nova very close to our entry
position. Since the competitor under this objective basically ignores
the costs, such a move would generally be quite reckless. On the
other hand, under the assumption that the new entrant can be success-
fully "attacked" before he gains a foothold, such an approach again
might be profitable in the long r
The competitive niche atid joint profit maximization options lead
to quite similar positionings , much closer to the core of the market
than the profit maximizing position. The reasons for the somewhat
surprising move closer to the center seems to be the lower costs
involved in operating there (which affects the joint profit solution)
and the relatively low price the second competitor can then charge for
its products (which affects the niche solution). Thus, should the
minimum cost point be located closer to competitor 2 r s present loca-
tion, one would conjecture that these two solutions would lie even
closer to the initial position.
Since the first competitor finds himself in the same situation
under our niche entry a~s under the previous profit maximising entry,
5
the prediction of his it exactly as there.
4
It should be noted that this t ture constitutes one of the
fruitful poir,' considerat t out by the use of the present
model. These points and other similar questions can be analyzed with
the help of the usu oe of sensitivity analysis. In any real-world
•plication sue! Lvity ana becomes mandatory.
5In the case where only one competitor is likely to react, a game
theory approach raigl jsibly yield a saddle point solution. In
general, however, the game is not zero-sum, since it is always pos-
sible to draw extra sales from the non-reacting competitor (s)
.
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In Figures 6 and 7 the possible competitive responses pa our entry
at ~2/-l--the j,oint_ p r o f it _max imizing p.ojsit ion - -ar e shown. This time compe-
titor one will lose several of his c •, our entry—three out of
five to be exact --and as a res diets some substantial
moves, except for the joint profit maximizing case, Both the profit
maximizing and sale: s would lead him to challenge
competitor two, a positio seems quite unlikely considering his
earlier reluctance to do that. Even so, »Ith a new brand in the market
the best move is clearly to attack not the new brand --remember that the
entering brand here joint p ximizing, a non-aggressive option--
but rather the other established brand. If competitor one would rather
"switch than fight" it is clear that the
niche solution positioning the brand at 4/-2 will provide a quite
acceptable alternative, since there the profits will not be much worse
than in the initial location with only one competitor.
For our jointly maximizing entry, competitor two will have rela-
tively little need for re-positioning. True, his sales maximizing
approach would still I to a challenge at Q/-2, but basically the
other three object
v
small movement towards the core of
the market, to recapture some marginal customers and to take advantage
of the lower operating - center. The joint profit maximiz-
ing location clearly will hurt competitor one much more than competitor
two
.
Summarizing the results from this discussion of the "first order"
reactions by the existing brands, it seems clear that short run profit
maximizing entry at 3/2 will invite retaliation by competitor two,
leaving us rather badly off afterwards. The joint profit maximizing
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entry at -2/-1, on the other hand, potentially affects competitor one's
sales considerably, making retaliatory repositioning of his brand a
strong possibility, and probably forcing a subsequent move by competi-
tor two. Our safest bet seems to be the competitive niche position
at 4/-2 which minimizes the risk for competitive repositioning and
still leaves us with a quite reasonable profit.
The Case of Several Compet itive Relocations
It might be that further reactions are possible, however, so that
after the competitors r initial reaction, our firm has the possibility
of repositioning to another spot, and that even further moves are
feasible e This could be the case where strictly functional and easily
changed characteristics of the products matter, so -that by changing the
product specifications to a limited extent, new customers could be
attracted. A case in point might be, industrial markets for chemical
products or a consumer durables market such as a stereo component set.
In these situations, the appropriate application of the model presented
involves several relocations before either a limit on the number of moves
is encountered, or an equ iuxn position of the brands is arrived at.
In general t these pote mid need to be carried out for a
number of altc >e str, points, so that the one with the highest
total expected va] >e pic; • . firm.
&Te will extend the precc tage illustration to exhibit
some of the characteristics of the multi-stage location problem. In
Figure 8 a possible se of relocations by competitor two and the
new brand entering at 3/2 is displayed. As we saw in the earlier discus-
tion, the first competitor is not affected direct lyty tn *-s entry. The
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second competitor on the other hand does suffer considerably. As a
consequence, he might move to position 2/2, his profit maximizing posi-
tion after our entry. Given such « response, we might want to persist
in which case our profit maximizing move is to 1/1, that is, just: one
move over. Given that both firms persist ir this aggressive behavior
there will not be an equilibrium, but the tsone-move~over" pattern will
persist throughout. This case of cutthroat competition does occur
especially in local markets--but see also the rent-a-car business for a
national exampla--and as a new entrant we might want to avoid such a
potentially costly positioning strategy.
Accordingly, the new entrant might develop a strategy of initially
entering at his short run maximizing position 3/2 and then "retire" to
the niche solution as soon as competitor two reacts. In this way some
possibility is retained of getting the most of competitor two*s cus-
tomers (in case two does not react), while at the same time a costly
competitive warfare is avoided. The likely outcome is portrayed in
Figure 9, where it is assumed that competitor two will yield to z niche
solution (at 1/1) once we settled , c our niche position (4/-2). The
profits at this location can then be compared with the profits obtained
throughout the incessant warfare, and with the payoffs for an initial
direct location at 4/-2, and the strategy with the highest (expected)
value chosen.
If the assumption of a quickly yielding competitor is seen as
unrealistic it is easy enough to see what would happen if he persists
in using the profit maximizing objective. In Figure 10 is depicted the
probable sequence of events; he will (as could be expected) largely
pursue us to the alternative niche locations we move to (conditional
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upon his last move),, and again no particular positions wil^ be stable.
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that in this particular
example the two firms will end up shifting between the two positions
1/1 and 4/-2, and one would expect that in such a market structure some
accommodation would sooner or later be reached between the firms--
provided , of course, that the financial capabilities of the entering
firm will allow a struggle at all.
Where the entering firm wants to avoid reprisals if at all pos-
sible, then, the initial niche choice seems again the best choice in the
given market structure. The firm might still ask itself whether it
might not improve its profit position, however, by choosing some simi-
lar alternative location; the niche solution, after all, is determined
xtfith reference to the minimum customer distance, which really does not
reflect completely the profit picture of the firm. One procedure to follow could
then be tc isolate all points in the product space where the com-
petitive effects are identical to the niche solution--?:© that the pro-
bability of competitive reaction is the same-~but where profits are
higher. One such location is at 3.'
-4, somewhat "below" the niche solu-
tion (see Figure 1) . By loc further away from the core of
the market and from the competitors, the entering firm will still
attract its earl!' stomers but can charge a higher price . That such
an opportunity can i actice ij ir from many sellers of high
priced consumer •, upon an "exclusive" segment of the market.
Also, the entering firm might simply want to consider some points
yielding some more sales than the niche solution, but yet not aggressive
enough to directly affront some particular competitor. In such a case
it might be interesting to consider the, two .alternatives 3/-1 and 3/0
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which both yield higher sales and profit than locating at 4/-2. For
the 3/0 location the model predicts a countermove to 2/0 by a profit-
maximizing second competitor, and as before, the war fare is on (see
Figure 11). A weak competitor two will basically not move, and will
still maintain some sales at his old location, although more than half
of the customers go to the new entry. Accordingly, one would generally
expect a more aggressive reaction.
For the 3/-1 option, however, the prof itmaximizing competitor two
will only move to 2/2, a reasonably conservative countermove. In fact,
the niche response is greater, (to 1/1) due to the higher price the
model allows for the 2/2 position. The move to 2/2, however, is suffi-
cient to recover the lost core of the market. Comparing the profit
made at an entry location of 4/-2 versus one at 3/-1 with a competitive
move to 2/2, we see that the position at 4/ ] -olving greater product
differentiation will be slightly preferable in the long run.
In sum, when several sequential reactions are possible, a number
of alternative patterns might emerge. Basically, if two firms engage
in profitmaximizing behavior with to all the segments, the
model predicts cutthroat competition, until one competitor yields some
segment (s) to the other or is forced out of the market. Even where
only one fir jM of the other firms, an
equilibrium position eight not be found unless the yielding firms give
up most of their s. It is in such cases that the number of
necessary feasible sequential moves be predetermined for the analysis
to have a terminal point.
Where the reactions of the firms take considerable time
s
the short
run gains of the entrant will be significant in the profit picture.
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Furthermore, subsequent moves will also be of interest since the new
6
transient positions will be held for quite some time. Finally, in the
case where reactions are quick, so that the equilibrium or terminal
positions are reached quite early , the analysis can be focused upon the
gains at the final positions, and an evaluation of the alternative
starting points concentrated upon these values.
Possibl e .Extensions
There are several extensions of the presented model framework that
can be proposed. For example; the competitive reaction is treated as
an either -or phenomenon, with the focus upon where the competitor would
move if at all. Clearly,- in most cases the reaction is better seen as
probabilistic > with a certain chance of a response conditional upon a
given entry location. Then the model would be used for the prediction
of the chosen position by the competitor
,
given that a reaction occurs.
Such a probabilistic approach necessitates the assignment of like-
lihoods of reaction for each competitor separately, given alternative
entry points and consequent sales losses. This assignment has to be
done on the basis of management judgment with support of whatever data
are available. Then, for each trial location, the customer purchases
are computed by the model, and used in conjunction with the assigned
probabilities lop the likelihoods of competitive response. The
payoffs to the entering firm for that particular trial location are
r
In many cases it might be. most realistic to see the re-locations as an
ongoing market phenomenon, the equilibrium or terminal points never
reached because of external shocks to the market, changing the very
positions of these points. In such dynamic markets the re-positioning
might take place not necessarily in sequence but rather more or less
simultaneously. Such markets will clearly need more sophisticated
analysis than we can carry out here.
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then computed as the weighted average of the profits from t;he no-
response case and the profits from the response case, the likelihoods
constituting the weights. These payoffs would be computed in the same
way as the payoffs in the earlier cases discussed.
Another extension wou . for the probable imprecision in the
firm's ability to position a brand within the given product space. As
was indicated in the beginning, it assumed throughtout that exact
positioning is possible. If this is not the case, so that only approx-
imate locations can be determined, the trial locations evaluated by the
model clearly need to be fewer. This can quite easily be dealt with by
letting the algorithm make bigger jumps, for example. A related pro-
blem, that of not being able to locate next to a competitor, can also
be accommodated easily within the model by eliminating trial locations
within some, radius of the competitors.
If it is desired that the loyalty to established brands be allowed
to differ between customers, separate weighting factors (in addition
to price) can easily be assigned to the different customers, Simi-
larly, the possibility of splitting the sales between two equidistant
competitors can be directly incorporated.
Another possible extension would be to allow customers and compe-
titors to change positions over time without any necessary overt actions
This would correctly describe at least the experience of new customers
and new firms attempting to i up a market i In the latter
case, the model could quite easily be extended to incorporate a trial
period for the entering brand, so that switching from the old brands
would be probabilistic, perhaps increasing with decreasing distance and
with the number of already converted customers. There would be some
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problem in assessing these probabilities, but the approach ^eems feas-
ible (panel data might be useful).
Changing desires on the part of the customers--and consequent
changes in their locations --will, however, create problems. If the
changes can be predicted, the evaluation will simply consist of a sum
of payoffs over the pi. ,_ period using the forecasted location
changes. If these predictions are probabilistic, the sum of the pay-
offs will consist of a sum of random variables, and an expected payoff
maximization approach will have to be followed. Both those cases can
be dealt with quite easily with some algorithm changes. The problem is
that customer changes will in many cases be very difficult to predict,
and their magniture and timing hard to spot in advance. Given this,
one might want to simply see them as random shocks internal to the
model, and work with the present values established by the research,
using the model in exactly the way presented above, accepting the
inevitable loss of predictive accuracy.
Summary
In this paper, a decision rc cr new product positioning in the
face of potential competitive response has been developed. Drawing
upon earlier work or, competitors' and customers' locations in a product
space, an iterative clustering algorithm was developed to predict where
a reacting competitor might case the entering firm attracts
several of the competitor's present customers. The model was used for
the evaluation of best entry position for an illustrative case with
alternative objective functions for the entrant as well as for the
existing firms.
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As with many other models , the value of the proposed framework to
marketing management probably lies less in the explicit solution of the
product positioning problem--although such a solution are directly
derived for any particular specif ication--than in the sharp relief into
which the model sets the crucial issues of new product positioning. As
such, the model should be of use not only to management t but also to
public policy makers wich an interest in developing conditions favorable
to a customer oriented differentiation of product offerings.

TABLE 1
Parameter Setting s
# of Customers/Segments ». 15
# of Competitors/Existing Brands e 2
# of Dimensions « 2
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Competitor 1
Fixed Costs = 10.00
Moving Costs = 1.00 2.0C
Competit or 2
Fixed Costs = 12.00
Moving Costs = 1.00 2.00
Customer =- 1
Customer - 2
Customer = 3
Customer = 4
Customer s 5
Customer = 6
Customer =• 7
Customer = 8
Customer * 9
Customer * 10
Customer = 11
Customer = 12
Customer =13
Customer » 14
Customer = 15
Location = -4.00 -4.00
Var. Costs = 8.00
Revenue * 120.00
Location = 2.00 3.00
Var. Costs ^ 7.00
Revenues * 300.00
Price - 12.00
Profits » 30.00
Location * 1.,00 1.00
Location = 2,.00 1.00
Location SB -1, 00 5.00
Location =' -5,.00-1.00
Location S2 -5.,00 0.00
Location = 3,.00-4.00
Location = .00 3.00
Location a 1,.00 0.00
Location e 5.,00-4.00
Loc a t : a. 2 ,00 4.0C
Location s -4,,00-5.00
Location - .00-1.00
Location =.- 3 ,00-1.00
Location = 4, 00-2.00
Location ~ ij .00 4.00
Price « 12.00
Profits B 113.00
Potential ES 2.00
Potential 3.00
Potential 1.00
Potential = 3.00
Potential •,- 1.00
Potential ss 2.00
Potential a 2,00
Potential •a 2.00
Potential * 4.00
Potential - 3.00
Potential 3.00
Potential - 1.00
Potential ~ 2.00
Potential u; 2.00
Potential ES 4.00
Data en Po sition ing F
i
.
Fixed Costs = 10,50 Kin. Cost Point * 0.00 0.00
Moving Costs -1.00 2. Price as a Prop, of Var. Cost - 4.40
Var. Cost Intercept * 7.00 Var. Cost Slop .10
Objective Func tion
Own profit max.
Jo int pi o f i t max
.
Competitive niche
Own sales max.
Code
1
2
3
4

.:urs l
Initial Entry
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Positioning Firm ID;
("0" for new entry)
Existing brands' locations marked HLl
,
{Tj , etc.
Customer ideal poi?.:
(the numbers indicate customer ID#)
Optimal location marked A
(the numbers indicate positioning
firm ID and objective function
ID, respectively).
Objective Function Code
Own profit max. 1
Joint profit max. 2
Competitive niche 3
Own sales max 4
10
4$ —4$
15
A0104
.
—
>
02
13,&
03
A-
-1
11
-5
^
J_
-3 -2
-4
-5
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FIGURE I (cont'd)
(Positioned Firm Coded as: 3)
active Function: 1
ii ii >m>irm«>ii irnni uinim i «i iiihiiiihi ii rim hi mi iiiiiiw him m !¥
Optimal Location = 3.00 2
Value of the. Object! action « 52.58
Unit Var. Costs » 8.30 Price « 11.62
Customer # to Firm #
1 3
2 3
3 2
4 L
5 _
& 3
7
8
9
10 2
11 1
12 I
13 3
14 3
15
Compatitor » i Revenue * 96.00 Costs - 74.00 Profits - 22.00
Competitor 2 Revenue - 96.00 Costs H 68.00 Profits - 28.00
Competitor - 3 Revenue - 220.78 Costs s 168,20 Profits « 52.58
Objective Function: 2
Op t ima 1 Locat ion - 2 . 00
Value of the Objective Function. 134.50
Unit Var. Costs * 7.50 Price 12.00
Customer # to Firm #
1
2 2
3 2
4 3
5 3
6 3
7 2
8 2
9 2
10 2
11 1
12 3
13 2
14 2
15 2
Competitor = 1 Revenue * 36.00 Costs - 34.00 Profits *» 2.00
Competitor * 2 Revenue * 300.00 Costs - 187.00 Profits = 113.00
Competitor * 3 Revenue - 84.00 Costs - 64.50 Profits - 19.50
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FIGURE 1 (cont'd)
Objective Function: 3
*»*m>*m*r ,m i mm >wuMM*amMmm* <m^w i- ii iw i wm i r. n i .raw*
Optimal Location * 4.00 -2.00
Value of the Objective Function « 413.88
Unit Var. Costs - 9. DC Price « 12.60
Customer # to Firm i
1 2
1 2
3 2
4 1
5 1
6 3
7 2
8 2
9 3
10 2
11 1
12 1
13 3
14 3
15 2
Competitor SB 1 Revenue 96.00 Costs « 74.00 Profits 22,,00
Competitor 2 Revenue = 204.00 Costs - 131.00 Profits <= 73,,00
Competitor IS 3 Revenue « 126.00 Costs * 100.50 Profits 25,.50
Objec t iveFunet ion
Optimal Location - 3,00 2.00
Value of the Objective Function » 220.78
Customer # to Firm #
1 3
2 3
3 2
4 1
5 1
6 3
7 3
8 3
9 3
10 2
11 1
12 1
13 3
14 3
15 1
Competitor - 1 Revenue 96.00
Competitor » 2 Revenue 96.00
Competitor * 3 Revenue » 220.78
Costs 74.00
Costs - 68.00
Costs « 168.20
Profits « 22.00
Profits - 28.00
Profits - 52.58

FIGURE 2
Competitor Two's Reaction to_.a_Prof.it Max. Entry
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Positioning Firm ID; 2
("0M for new entry)
Existing brands' location marked HQ, jTj , etc
Customer ideal points marked (x)
Optimal location marked
&
$5 ®
-4$—
4£-
24
_21
4$
-1toj m»w>T-f,» imi | ib
4W-
-5 •»z_. -3 -2
1-5
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FIGURE 2 (cont'd)
(Positioned Firm Coded as: 4)
Objective Funct ion: 1
ii* i nmm i\ i \m\mi r» iiiimhhiii wiiii m^m !
Optimal Location 2.00 2,00
Value of the Objective Function » 45.28
Unit Var. Costs 7.80 Price « 10 .92
Customer # to Fi.rm #
1 4
2 4
3 4
4 I
5 i
6 4
7 3
8 4
9 4
10 4
11 1
12 1
13 4
14 3
15 3
Competitor « 1 Revenue 96.00 Costs 74.,00
Competitor * 3 Revenue * 93.60 Costs = 76.,90
Competitor *s 4 Revenue =* 207.48 Costs 160,,20
Profits «= 22.00
Profits • 16.70
Profits - 47.28
(^-iggtAy-g
-F-M^- 1 ion : 2
Optinal Location = 1.00 0.00
Value of the Objective Function - 104.70
Unit Var. Costs * 7.10 Price « 11.90
Customer # to Firm
1 4
2 3
3 j
4 1
5 1
6 4
7
8 4
9 4
10
ii 1
12 4
13 4
14 4
15 3
Competitor - 1 Revenue - 84 . 00
Competitor » 3 Revenue - 152.10
Competitor » 4 Revenue * 178.50
Costs « 66.00 Profits - 18.00
Costs - 118.40 Profits - 33.70
Costs - 118.50 Profits - 60.00
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FIGURE 2 (cont'd)
Objective Function: 3
Optimal Location 4e00 -2.00
Value of the Objective Function * 426.88
Unit Var. Costs * 9.00 Price * 12.60
Customer # to Firm #
1
2
3
4
5
7
7
6
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Competitor
Competitor
Competitor 4
3
3
3
1
1
4
3
3
4
3
1
1
4
4
3
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
96.00 Costs «= 74.00
198.90 Costs « 151.60
126.00 Costs = 102.00
Profits - 22.00
Profits 47.30
Profits 24.00
Ob 1 active Function: 4
Op t ima 1 Loc a t ion - 2 . 00 2 . 00
Value of the Objective Function 207.48
Unit Var. Costs ~ 7.80 10.,92
Customer # to F:Lrm #
1 4
2 A
••>
4
4 1
5 1
6 4
7 3
8 4
9 4
10 4
11 1
12 1
13 4
14 3
15 3
Competitor as. 1 Revenue e 96.00 Costs - 74.00
Competitor £1 3 Revenue 93.60 Costs - 76.90
Competitor 4 Revenue « 207.48 Costs - 160.20
Profits - 22.00
Profits 16.70
Profits « 47.28
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FIGURE 3
Competitor One 8 a React ion to a Profit Max. Entry
Positioning Firm ID: 1
("0" for new entry)
Existing brands* locations marked [Tj, |Tj, etc.
Customer ideal points marked (x)
Optimal location marked A
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FIGURE 3 (cont'd)
(Positioned Firm Coded as: 4)
Objective Function: 1
Optimal Location * 3.00 0.00
Value of the Objective Function - 54.00
Unit. Var. Costs * 7.9 Price = 11.06
Customer # to Firm
1 4
2 4
3 2
4 4
> 4
6 4
7 3
8 4
9 4
10 2
11 4
12 -
13 4
14 4
15
Competitor 2 Revenue
Competitor ~ 3 Revenue
Competitor « 4 Reve r r
96.00 Costs « 68.00 Profits - 28.00
23.40 Coats - 27.10 Profits «= -3.70
276.50 Costs « 207.50 Profits * 69.00
Ob.i ec t ive FuncA.
i
on
_:_ 2
Optimal Location - 1.00 0.00
Value of the Obiecfcive Function = 1.17.10
Unit Var. C I OS ts C 10 Price * 11.90
Customer # to F:Lrm #
1 4
2 3
3 o£
4 L
4
6 4
7 3
8 4
9 4
10 2
11 4
12 4
13 4
14 4
15 2
Competitor * 2 Revenue « 96.00 Costs = 68.00 Profits 28.00
Competitor - 3 Revenue = 58.50 Costs = 52.00 Profits * 6.50
Competitor S= j£j, Revenue 261.80 Costs 166,20 Profits * 95.60
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FIGURE 3 (cont'd)
Objective Function: 3
Optimal Location » 0,00 -1,00
Value of the Objective Function •» 498.65
Unit Var. Costs = 7-10 Price « 9.94
Customer # to Firm #
1 4
2 3
3 2
4 4
5 4
6
7 3
8 4
9 4
10 2
11 4
12 4
13 4
14 4
15 2
Competitor - 2 Revenue « 96.00 Costs = 68.00 Profits = 28.00
Competitor - 3 Revenue = 58.50 Costs = 52.00 Profits * 6.50
Competitor - 4 Revenue ~ 218.68 Costs * 116.20 Profits 52.48
Objective Function; 4
Optimal Location = 3.00 1.00
Value of the Objective Function 280.00
Unit Var. Costs - 8.00 Price - 11.20
Customer # to Firm #
1 4
2
3 2
4 4
5 4
6 4
'! 3
8 4
9 4
10 2
11 4
12 4
13 4
14 4
15 2
Competitor ES 2 Revenue = 96.00 Costs « 68.00 Profits - 28.00
Competitor C qj Revenue - 23.40 Costs 27.10 Profits -3.70
Competitor 4 Revenue - 280.00 Costs - 210.00 Profits - 70.00
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FIGURE 4
Competitor Two's Reaction to a Competitive Niche Entry
Positioning Firm ID: 2
(
H M for new entry)
Existing brands* locations marked FFj, [2
Customer ideal points marked (x\
Optimal location marked A
.
etc
8
^
—
&
|2
.23
^
sr-
-—
-
. . & -1
24
:*—
€p
4}
4"«
l
-3=
1-4
-4
... ~l
.5
-2 -1
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FIGURE 4 (cont f d)
(Positioned form coded as: 4)
Objective Function:,
__1
Optimal Location « 3.00 3,00
Value of the Objective Function » 46.84
Unit. Var. Costs » 8. Price - 12.32
Customer # to Firm
1 4
2 4
3 4
4 1
5 1
6 3
7 4
8 4
9 3
10 4
11 1
12 -t
13 3
14 3
15 4
Competitor 13 1 Revenue 96 ,00
Competitor 3 Revenue «* 126..00
Competitor - 4 Revenue 209 .44
Costs - 74.00 Profits «= 22.00
Costs - 100.50 Profits «= 25.50
Costs « 161.60 Profits - 47.84
Objective Function: 2
Optimal Location = I. 00 0.00
Value of the Objective Function 116.30
Unit Var. Costs- 7.100 Price * 12.20
Customer # to Firm #
1 4
2 4
3 4
4 1
5 1
6 3
7 4
8 4
9 3
10 . 4
11 1
12 4
13 3
14 3
15 4
Competitor « 1 Revenue =* 84.00 Costs * 66.00 Profits * 18.00
Competitor - 3 Revenue 126.00 Costs 100.50 Profits - 25.50
Competitor * 4 Revenue - 219. 60 Costs 139.80 Profits - 79.80
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FIGURE 4 (cont'd)
Ob i ec t: iv s Func t ion : 3
Optimal Location * 1.00 1..00
Value of the Objective Function 388.47
Unit Var. Costs - 7.20 Price * 10.08
Customer # to Firm
1 4
2 4
J 4-
4 1
5 1
(j 3
7 4
8 4-
9 3
10 4
11 1
12 4
14 3
15 4
Competitor 1 Revenue » 84-00 Costs * 66.00 Profits «= 18.00
Competitor * 3 Revenue * 126,00 Costs 100,50 Profits = 25.50
Competitor » 4 Revenue * 181,44 Costs «*•• 141.60 Profits = 39.84
Objective Funct io n
Optimal Location - 3,00 -2.00
Value of the Objective Function «= 244,02
Unit Var, Costs * 8, Pric^ - 11,62
Customer # t . i > Firm #
1 4
2 1
3 4
4 1
5 I
6 4
7 4
8
9 3
10 4
11 1
12 1
13 4
14 3
15 4
Competitor £1 1 Revenue * 9b,:,00 Costs * 74 . 00 Profits «= 22.,00
Competitor Kl: 3 Revenue * 75, Costs m 64,50 Profits «* 11.,10
Competitor m 4 Revenue «= 244 ,02 Costs - 186*30 Profits = 57.,72
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FIGURE 5
i
Competit or One's Reac tion to a Competitive Niche Entry
Positioning Firm ID: 1
("O" for new entry)
Existing brands' locations marked [T) , jT], etc
Customer ideal points marked (x)
Optimal location marked
4—
&
® 3
1™- « &
,14
-1
-2
-3
-5
13
^
-4 -3
..-
—
-1
JL1
# "^-4
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FIGURE 5 (cont'd)
(Positioned Firm Coded as: 4)
Ob 1 ec tiv e Func t ion :. 1
Optimal Location = 2. 00 -1.00
Value of the Objective Function » 29.00
Unit Var. Costs - 7.50 Price * 10,50
Customer # to Firm #
4
2 4
3 2
4 4
5 4
6 3
7 2
8 4
9
10 2
11 4
12 4
13 4
14 3
15 2
Competitor - 2 Revenue ss 120.00 Costs 82.00 Profits = 38.00
Competitor = 3 Revenue E= 100.80 Costs « 82,50 Profits = 18.30
Competitor - 4 Revenue 5S 178.50 Costs » 137.50 Profits = 41.00
Objective Function: 2
Optimal Location « 0.00 -1.00
Value of the Objective Function « 119.50
Unit Var. Costs - 71.0 Price * 12.20
Customer if to Fit .
1 2
2 2
2
H 4
5
6
7 2
8 4
9 3
10 £
11 4
12 4
13 3
14 3
15 2
Competitor - 2 Revenue * 180.00
Competitor * 3 Revenue = 126,00
Competitor - 4 Revenue « 122.00
Costs e 117.00
Costs * 100.50
Costs 81.00
Profits = 63.00
Profits = 25.50
Profits - 41.00
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FIGURE 5 (cont'd)
Objective Function: 3
Optimal Location «= -4.-00 -1.00
Value of the Objective Function *» 373.67
Unit Var. Costs » 8.70 Price 12.18
Customer # to Firm #
2
2 2
3 2
4 4
5 4
r
D 3
7 2
8 2
9 3
10 2
11 4
12 4
13 3
14 3
15 2
Competitor R 2 Revenue - 204.00 Costs - 131.00 Profits * 73.00
Competitor = 3 Revenue - 126.00 Costs - 100.50 Profits - 25.50
Competitor B! 4 Revenue * 97.44 Costs - 79.60 Profits - 17.84
Objective Function; 4
I
-
-
J
-11
--Mill - 1 IT I
Optimal Location * 3.00 1,00
Value of the Objective Function = 190.40
Unit Var. Costs * 8.00 Price » 11.20
Customer # to Firm #
1 4
2 4
3 ?
4 4
5 4
6
7 4
8 4
9 3
10 2
11 4
12 4
13 3
14 3
15 2
Competitor = 2 Revenue = 96,.00
Competitor - 3 Revenue « 126.,00
Competitor =.- 4 Revenue « 190 .40
Costs *» 68.00 Profits = 28.00
Costs 100.50 Profits « 25.50
Costs = 146.00 Profits - 44.40
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FIGURE 6
Competitor Two's Reaction to a Joint Profit Max, Entry
Positioning Firm ID: 2
("0* 8 for new entry)
Existing brands' locations marked jTJ s J2j , etc.
Customer ideal points marked (x)
Optimal location marked A
#
®—&
f
fit
i21
,24 \ 22
0-
7
-r
€r
6r
€J
-1
-2
-3
~Xx "'
-5
-4
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FIGURE 6 (cont'd)
(Positioned Firm Coded as: 4)
Objective Function: 1
Optimal Location « 3.00 2.00
Value of the Objective Function •* 74.64
Unit Var. Costs"- 8.30 Price « 11.62
Customer # to Fire
1
2 4
3 4
4 3
5 3
6 4
7 4
8 4
9 4
10 4
11 1
12 3
13 4
14 4
15 4
Competitor - 1 Revenue t;t 36 .00
Competitor 3 Revenue » 60 .00
Competitor * 4 Revenue *» jiJ
.
.74
Costs * 34.00
Costs - 48.00
Costs » 236.10
Profits 2.00
Profits « 12.00
Profits «= 77.64
Obj ec t ive
ir
Func t ion : 2
to
Optimal Location - 0.00 0.00
Value of the Objective Function to 129.00
Unit Var. Costs * 7. Price * 12.00
Firm #
4
4
3
3
4
Customer #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Competitor K 1
Competitor - 3
Competitor 4
1
3
4
'..
4
Revenue « 36.00
Revenue - 60.00
Revenue - 324.00
Costs « 34.00
Costs « 48.00
Costs = 201.00
Profits « 2.00
Profits = 12.00
Profits = 123.00
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FIGURE 6 (cont'd)
Objective Function: 3
Optimal Location * 2.00 1.00
Value of the Objective Function * 442,46
Unit Var. Costs - 7.50 Price - 10.50
Customers # to Firm #
1 4
2 4
3 4
4 3
3
6 4
—
t
4
8 4
9 4
10
11 1
12 3
13 4
14 4
15 4
Competitor as 1 Revenue - 36.00 Costs - 34.00 Profits = 2.00
Competitor ts 3 Revenue * 60,00 Costs « 48.00 Profits - 12.00
Competitor cs 4 Revenue
Obie
« 283.50 Costs »
ictive Function: 4
214.50 Profits - 69.00
Optimal Location - -2.00 0.00
Value of the Objective Function *» 321.16
Unit Var . Costs BC 74. Price « 10..J6
Customer # to F:Lrrc #
1 4
2 4
3 4
4 4
5 4
6
7 4
8 4
9 4
10 4
11 1
12 3
13 4
14 4
15 4
Competitor I Revenue 36,.00 Costs * 34.00 Profits 2.00
Competitor = 3 Revenue 12,,00 Costs - 18 . 00 Profits * -6.00
Competitor *. 4 Revenue " 321 ,16 Costs * 241.40 Profits * 79.76

FIGURE 7
Competitor One*s Reaction to a Joint Max. Entf
——»——— ——.
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Positioning Firm ID: 1
("0" for new entry)
Existing brands' locations marked
Customer ideal points marked (x)
Optimal location marked A
rn
,
etc
$
-.
^
11
14
$$—#
® 4i
1—
-
T^f
^
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5t$
-3 -1
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FIGURE 7 (cont'd)
(Positioned Firm Coded as: 4)
Objective Function: 1
Optimal Location = 3.00 2.00
Value of the Objective Function - 34.08
Unit Var. Costs = 8.30 Price = 11.62
Customer # to Firm #
1 4
2 4
3 2
4 3
3
6 4
7 4
8 4
9 4
10 2
11 3
12 3
13 4
14 4
15 2
Competitor « 2 Revenue - 96.00 Costs 68.00 Profits = 28,.00
Competitor * 3 Revenue = 96.00 Costs = 70.50 Profits = 25 .50
Competitor = 4 Revenue - 220.78 Costs = 167.70 Profits - 53 .08
Objective Function: 2
Optimal Location -3.00 -4,00
Value of the Objective Function * 130=50
Unit Var. Costs - 9.50 Price 12.00
Customer # to 03 #
i 2
2 2
3 2
4 3
5 3
o 3
7 2
8 2
9 2
10 2
11 4
12 3
13 2
14 2
15 2
Competitor - 2 Revenue = 300,.00
Competitor - 3 Revenue * 84,,00
Costs = 187.00 Profits - 113.00
Costs - 63.00 Profits = 21.00
Competitor = 4 Revenue « 36.00 Costs - 38.50 Profits = -2.50
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FIGURE 7 (cont'd)
Objective Function;
_
,3
Optimal Location - 4.00 -2.00
Value of the Objective Function 398.80
Unit Var. Costa * 9.00 Price - 12.60
Customer # to Firm #
1 2
2 2
3 2
4 3
3
6 4
7 2
8 2
9 4
10 2
11 3
12 3
13 4
14 4
15 2
Competitor - 2 Revenue * 204.00 Costs - 131.00 Profits = 73.00
Competitor - 3 Revenue - 96.00 Costs - 70.50 Profits 25.50
Competitor - 4 Revenue = 126.00 Costs - 100.00 Profits 26.00
i active Function: 4
Optimal Location «= 3.00 2,00
Value of the Objective Function * 220.78
Unit Var. Costs * 8.30 Price - 11.62
Customer # to I' ;
1 4
2 4
3
4 3
5 3
6 4
7 4
8 4
9 4
10 2
,1
1
3
12 3
13 4
14 4
15 2
Competitor * 2 Revenue - 96.00 Costs - 68.00 Profits - 28.00
Competitor - 3 Revenue - 96,00 Costs - 70.50 Profits - 25.50
Competitor - 4 Revenue * 220.78 Costs * 167.70 Profits - 53.08

FIGURE 8
Persistent Multi-stage Reactions to
a Persistent Profit Max. Entry
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Competitor 1 Competitor 2 Entrant Stage
-4/-4 2/3 -_
-4/-4 2/3 3/2 (obj. fn: 1) 1
-4/-4 2/2 (obj. fn
: 1) 3/2 2
-4/
-4 2/2 1/1 (obj. fn: 1) 3
-4/
-4
,,,„. „ , ,
2/1 (obj. fn: 1) 1/1 4
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FIGURE 9
Non-persisten t Multi-stage Reactions
to a Non-persistent Profit Max. Entry
Competitor 1 Competitor 2 Entrant Stage
-4/
-4 --
-4/
-4 2/3 3/2 (obj. fn: 1) 1
-4/
-4 2/2 (obj. fn: 1) 3/2 2
-4/ -4 4/-2 (obj. fn: 3) 3
-4/-4 1/1 (obj. fn; 3) 4/-2 4
-4/
-4 1/1 4/-2 (obj. fn: 3} 5
Firms* Standing at Equilibrium
(Competitor 2 Coded as: 4)
Customer # to Firm #
t 4
2 4
3 4
4 1
5 L
6 3
7 4
8 4
9
10 4
11 1
12 4
13 3
14 3
15 4
Competitor - 1 Revenue = 84 .00
Competitor = 3 Revenue - 126 .00
Competitor 5= ^ Revenue - 181 .44
Costs = 66.00
Costs = 100.50
Costs = 141.60
Profits - 18.00
Profits - 25.50
Profits - 39.84

FIGURE 10
Persistent Multi-stage Reactions
to a Non-persistent Profit__Max.
.
r
.
Entry
49
'
'
""
Competitor 1 Competitor 2 Entrant Stage
-4/-4 2/3 _„
-4/-4 2/3 3/2 (obj. fn: 1) 1
-4/
-4 2/2 (obj . fn: 1) 3/2 2
-4/-4 2/2 4/-2 (obj. fn: 3) 3
-4/-4 3/-2 (obj. fn: 1) 4/-2 4
-4/-4 3/-2 1/1 (obj. fn: 3) 5
-4/-4 2/1 (obj. fn: 1) 1/1 6
-4/-4
,.-, i, - i . . . . ~
2/1
—,.—„.,. ..,.,,.1 i .
4/
-2 (obj. fn: 3) 7

FIGURE 11
Two Alternative Entry Points
50
Competitor I Competitor 2 Entrant Stage
-4/-4 2/3 --
-4/-4 2/3 3/0 1
-4/-4 2/0 (obj. fn:
2/3 (obj. fn:
1) or
3)
3/0 2
Competitor 1 Competitor 2 Entrant Stage
-4/ -4 ft --
-4/
-4 2/3 3/-1 1
-4/-4 2/2 (obj. fn:
1/1 (obj. fn:
1) or
3)
3/-1 2

51
FIGURE 11 (cont'd)
Firms' Stand ing After Competitor. 2 Locates
at 2/2 After Entry at 3/-1
(Competitor 2 Coded as; 4)
Customer # to Firm #
1 4
2 4
3 t\
4 1
5 1
6 3
7 4
8 4
9 3
10 4
11 1
12 1
13 3
14 3
15 4
Competitor - 1 Revenue « 96 .00
Competitor = 3 Revenue = 112 ,00
Competitor = 4 Revenue - 185,.64
Costs =» 74.00 Profits = 22.00
Costs = 90.50 Profits - 21.50
Costs « 144.60 Profits = 41.04
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